— arhiva de citate
Fragmente ridicate din carte și așezate în ordinea apariției lor — sediment de gândire, nu colecție.
42 fragmente · marginalia indică pagina
- 001
„A man would be thought a madman who professed an art which he did not know; but he would be equally thought a madman if he did not profess a virtue which he had not.”
- 002
„to become good is difficult; to be good is easy”
- 003
„Pleasures are evils because they end in pain, and pains are goods because they end in pleasures.”
- 004
„knowledge is thus proved once more to be the governing principle of human life, and ignorance the origin of all evil: for no one prefers the less pleasure to the greater, or the greater pain to the less, except from ignorance.”
- 005
„No one chooses the evil or refuses the good except through ignorance.”
- 006
„That virtue cannot be taught is a paradox of the same sort as the profession of Socrates that he knew nothing.”
- 007
„For there is far greater peril in buying knowledge than in buying meat and drink: the one you purchase of the wholesale or retail dealer, and carry them away in other vessels, and before you receive them into the body as food, you may deposit them at home and call in any experienced friend who knows what is good to be eaten or drunken, and what not, and how much, and when; and then the danger of purchasing them is not so great. But you cannot buy the wares of knowledge and carry them away in another vessel; when you have paid for them you must receive them into the soul and go your way, either greatly harmed or greatly benefited; and therefore we should deliberate and take counsel with our elders; for we are still young—too young to determine such a matter.”
— Socrates - 008
„Thus man had the wisdom necessary to the support of life, but political wisdom he had not; for that was in the keeping of Zeus”
— Protagoras - 009
„no one punishes the evil-doer under the notion, or for the reason, that he has done wrong,—only the unreasonable fury of a beast acts in that manner. But he who desires to inflict rational punishment does not retaliate for a past wrong which cannot be undone; he has regard to the future, and is desirous that the man who is punished, and he who sees him punished, may be deterred from doing wrong again. He punishes for the sake of prevention, thereby clearly implying that virtue is capable of being taught.”
— Protagoras - 010
„What is the reason why good men teach their sons the knowledge which is gained from teachers, and make them wise in that, but do nothing towards improving them in the virtues which distinguish themselves?”
— Protagoras - 011
„whether he be a child only or a grown-up man or woman, must be taught and punished, until by punishment he becomes better, and he who rebels against instruction and punishment is either exiled or condemned to death under the idea that he is incurable;”
— Protagoras - 012
„Education and admonition commence in the first years of childhood, and last to the very end of life.”
— Protagoras - 013
„I would have you consider that he who appears to you to be the worst of those who have been brought up in laws and humanities, would appear to be a just man and a master of justice if he were to be compared with men who had no education, or courts of justice, or laws, or any restraints upon them which compelled them to practise virtue”
— Protagoras - 014
„all men are teachers of virtue, each one according to his ability; and you say Where are the teachers? You might as well ask, Who teaches Greek? For of that too there will not be any teachers found.”
— Protagoras - 015
„if a man is better able than we are to promote virtue ever so little, we must be content with the result.”
— Protagoras - 016
„which is the greatest good to the outward parts of a man, is a very great evil to his inward parts: and for this reason physicians always forbid their patients the use of oil in their food, except in very small quantities, just enough to extinguish the disagreeable sensation of smell in meats and sauces.”
- 017
„many a battle of words have I fought, and if I had followed the method of disputation which my adversaries desired, as you want me to do, I should have been no better than another, and the name of Protagoras would have been nowhere.”
— Protagoras - 018
„I do not wish to force the conversation upon you if you had rather not, but when you are willing to argue with me in such a way that I can follow you, then I will argue with you. Now you, as is said of you by others and as you say of yourself, are able to have discussions in shorter forms of speech as well as in longer, for you are a master of wisdom; but I cannot man age these long speeches: I only wish that I could. You, on the other hand, who are capable of either, ought to speak shorter as I beg you, and then we might converse. But I see that you are disinclined, and as I have an engagement which will prevent my staying to hear you at greater length…”
— Socrates - 019
„And therefore if you want to see Crison and me in the same stadium, you must bid him slacken his speed to mine, for I cannot run quickly, and he can run slowly. And in like manner if you want to hear me and Protagoras discoursing, you must ask him to shorten his answers, and keep to the point, as he did at first; if not, how can there be any discussion? For discussion is one thing, and making an oration is quite another, in my humble opinion.”
— Socrates - 020
„Now if Protagoras will make a similar admission, and confess that he is inferior to Socrates in argumentative skill, that is enough for Socrates; but if he claims a superiority in argument as well, let him ask and answer—not, when a question is asked, slipping away from the point, and instead of answering, making a speech at such length that most of his hearers forget the question at issue (not that Socrates is likely to forget—I will be bound for that, although he may pretend in fun that he has a bad memory).”
— Alcibiades - 021
„or friends argue with friends out of good-will, but only adversaries and enemies wrangle”
— Prodicus - 022
„gratified and not pleased; for gratification is of the mind when receiving wisdom and knowledge, but pleasure is of the body when eating or experiencing some other bodily delight”
— Prodicus - 023
„All of you who are here present I reckon to be kinsmen and friends and fellowcitizens, by nature and not by law; for by nature like is akin to like, whereas law is the tyrant of mankind, and often compels us to do many things which are against nature.”
— Hippias - 024
„the inferior or worse ought not to preside over the better;”
— Socrates - 025
„On the one hand, hardly can a man become good, For the gods have made virtue the reward of toil, But on the other hand, when you have climbed the height, Then, to retain virtue, however difficult the acquisition, is easy —(Works and Days).”
- 026
„Now whom does the force of circumstance overpower in the command of a vessel?—not the private individual, for he is always overpowered;”
- 027
„good may become deteriorated by time, or toil, or disease, or other accident (the only real doing ill is to be deprived of knowledge), but the bad man will never become bad, for he is always bad; and if he were to become bad, he must previously have been good. “ “no wise man, as I believe, will allow that any human being errs voluntarily, or voluntarily does evil and dishonourable actions;”
- 028
„When two go together, one sees before the other (Il.),' for all men who have a companion are readier in deed, word, or thought; but if a man 'Sees a thing when he is alone…”
— Homer - 029
„…he goes about straightway seeking until he finds some one to whom he may show his discoveries, and who may confirm him in them.”
- 030
„you are not only good yourself, but also the cause of goodness in others”
- 031
„those who have knowledge are more confident than those who have no knowledge, and they are more confident after they have learned than before.”
- 032
„And those, I said, who are thus confident without knowledge are really not courageous, but mad; and in that case the wisest are also the most confident, and being the most confident are also the bravest, and upon that view again wisdom will be courage.”
— Socrates - 033
„there is a difference between ability and strength; the former is given by knowledge as well as by madness or rage, but strength comes from nature and a healthy state of the body. And in like manner I say of confidence and courage, that they are not the same; and I argue that the courageous are confident, but not all the confident courageous. For confidence may be given to men by art, and also, like ability, by madness and rage; but courage comes to them from nature and the healthy state of the soul.”
— Protagoras - 034
„there are some pleasant things which are not good, and that there are some painful things which are good, and some which are not good, and that there are some which are neither good nor evil”
— Protagoras - 035
„the rest of the world are of opinion that knowledge is a principle not of strength, or of rule, or of command: their notion is that a man may have knowledge, and yet that the knowledge which is in him may be overmastered by anger, or pleasure, or pain, or love, or perhaps by fear,—just as if knowledge were a slave, and might be dragged about anyhow. Now is that your view? or do you think that knowledge is a noble and commanding thing, which cannot be overcome, and will not allow a man, if he only knows the difference of good and evil, to do anything which is contrary to knowledge, but that wisdom will have strength to help him?”
— Socrates - 036
„when men act contrary to knowledge they are overcome by pain, or pleasure, or some of those affections which I was just now mentioning.”
— Socrates - 037
„When men are overcome by eating and drinking and other sensual desires which are pleasant, and they, knowing them to be evil, nevertheless indulge in them, would you not say that they were overcome by pleasure?”
— Socrates - 038
„Would they not answer that they are not evil on account of the pleasure which is immediately given by them, but on account of the after consequences— diseases and the like?”
— Socrates - 039
„Suppose, again, the salvation of human life to depend on the choice of odd and even, and on the knowledge of when a man ought to choose the greater or less, either in reference to themselves or to each other, and whether near or at a distance; what would be the saving principle of our lives? Would not knowledge?—a knowledge of measuring, when the question is one of excess and defect, and a knowledge of number, when the question is of odd and even? The world will assent, will they not? Protagoras himself thought that they would. Well then, my friends, I say to them; seeing that the salvation of human life has been found to consist in the right choice of pleasures and pains,—in the choice of the more and the fewer, and the greater and the less, and the nearer and remoter, must not this measuring be a consideration of their excess and defect and equality in relation to each other?”
— Socrates - 040
„men err in their choice of pleasures and pains; that is, in their choice of good and evil, from defect of knowledge; and you admitted further, that they err, not only from defect of knowledge in general, but of that particular knowledge which is called measuring. And you are also aware that the erring act which is done without knowledge is done in ignorance. This, therefore, is the meaning of being overcome by pleasure;—ignorance, and that the greatest.”
— Socrates - 041
„Are not all actions honourable and useful, of which the tendency is to make life painless and pleasant?”
— Socrates - 042
„Is if the pleasant is the good, nobody does anything under the idea or conviction that some other thing would be better and is also attainable, when he might do the better. And this inferiority of a man to himself is merely ignorance, as the superiority of a man to himself is wisdom. They all assented. And is not ignorance the having a false opinion and being deceived about important matters? To this also they unanimously assented. Then, I said, no man voluntarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks to be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in human nature; and when a man is compelled to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the greater when he may have the less. All of us agreed to every word of this.”
— Socrates
